This briefing delves into the implications of employing language surrounding terrorism and explores Assad's use of the terminology to do so. This piece was written by Victoria Iamoni and edited by Tanvi Sureka.
Introduction
On the 8th of December 2024, the world watched in shock and anticipation as the notorious war criminal and President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, was finally toppled. Forced to flee, he had been a ruthless authoritarian dictator whose family had controlled Syria through oppression and terror for over 5 decades, resulting in the deaths of more than 617,910 people. Throughout the 13-year brutal civil war, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that “more than 14 million Syrians have been forced to flee their homes in search of safety.” He has faced numerous accusations of crimes against humanity, including the systematic use of “torture, sexual violence, and chemical weapons.” The incoming opposition, a coalition of rebel groups led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), achieved what years of brutal civil war could not. Surprising the geopolitical order, HTS capitalised on the instability within Iran and Hezbollah in the Middle East, as well as the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, confidently assessing that Assad was not as powerful as he seemed.
While fleeing to Moscow on December 16th, al-Assad issued a final statement as President of Syria. In an effort to save face to his followers on Telegram, he asserted that his departure from Syria was “neither planned nor did it occur during the final hours of the battles.” He expressed hope that Syria would one day be “free and independent." But, what stood out most in his statement was how he framed his enemy. Throughout the entire piece, Assad employed the language of terrorism to describe HTS. This article analyses Assad's statement to reveal how authoritarian leaders exploit the language of terrorism to delegitimise their political opponents. Given its rhetorical power, it has the potential to justify human rights violations, strengthen autocratic rule, and manipulate international perceptions. From al-Assad in Syria to Putin in Ukraine, this article highlights the dangers of allowing autocrats to wield the term "terrorist"—a label with profoundly negative connotations—without scrutiny.
What is the power of labelling someone a terrorist?
Before exploring how authoritarians manipulate the language of terrorism, it is essential to understand the debate surrounding its definition and implications. As academic Alan Greene writes, “The quest for a satisfactory definition of terrorism, described by Nicholas J Perry as the search for the ‘Holy Grail’, is one pursued by law and various other branches of the social sciences.” It is impossible to get everyone to agree. There are debates on who can commit terrorism, what actions qualify as terrorism, and the complicated morality of political violence.
This article will use Igor Primoratz’s definition: “the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they would otherwise not take.” His definition offers a broad framework for a nuanced application to various contexts. More crucially, it allows for the added complication of whether terrorism should be considered a moral or strategic act. Historian Richard English prefers the latter due to its understanding of the broader political context in which the attack is committed.
In his book Terrorism: How to Respond, English notes that “the label ‘terrorist’ works like the outlaw of old”; it is “value-laden”. He even describes it as “probably one of the most powerfully condemnatory words in the English Language.” This aligns with the view of terrorism as a moral act; it makes the perpetrator into an unredeemable figure, on which all countermeasures can be justified. This perspective makes sense for the general population given how, in a post-9/11 world, the public perception of terrorism has shifted to evoke images of extreme violence against civilians. When one thinks of terrorism, one thinks of suicide bombings, hijacked planes and the murder of innocents. While it is essential to condemn violence against innocents, there must be a critical acknowledgement of the rhetorical power of such labels.
In his article Terrorism as a Strategy, Lawrence Freedman argues that the term can be “a form of political abuse to delegitimise a range of political claims and deny the possibility of serious dialogue”, with it “condemn[ing] groups whose actual association with the methods of terrorism is at most loose or occasional”. By branding political opponents as terrorists, authoritarian leaders associate them with some of the worst crimes in history. But people forget that Nelson Mandela was considered a terrorist until 2008. This is not to say that there are no genuinely dangerous terrorist organisations; it is more to assert that when dictators such as Assad and Putin are invoking it, their motives should be carefully scrutinised.
What about HTS?
Having explored the political utility of terrorist rhetoric, the next question is: How does al-Assad employ this language? In his remarks, Assad stated, “As terrorist forces infiltrated Damascus” and "a flood of misinformation and narratives far removed from the truth, aimed at recasting international terrorism as a liberation revolution for Syria”.
Why? Superficially, this question has an easy answer—HTS is officially designated as a terrorist organisation by many countries and organisations, including the UK. The group’s founder and current leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, previously led Jabhat al-Nusra (ANF), an Al Qa’ida (AQ) affiliate in Syria. In July 2013, the UK ordered both organisations to“ be treated as alternative names for the organisation which is already proscribed under the name Al Qa’ida”.
Still, this designation might understate the situation's nuances, as Freedman argues above. Mackenzie Holtz’s 2023 report on HTS for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted that the organisation “was formed out of a merger of five Islamist militias and opposition factions in 2017” after Al-Jolani broke ties with the larger Al Qa’ida organisation to focus on Syria. While initially characterised as a “cosmetic manoeuvre” to avoid negative associations, Al Qa'ida condemned HTS’s creation. Holtz writes that it “suggests that HTS’s formation represented a substantial break from Jolani’s past as an al Qaeda affiliate.” However, it serves Assad to ignore this more nuanced understanding and continue to delegitimise them as terrorists rather than as a legitimate opposition force. Given how Al Qa’ida is hated globally, this is both for his people and the international arena. It makes sense as to why HTS would make such an effort to distance themselves, showing their understanding of the intense scrutiny that being labelled a terrorist gives.
However, it must be made explicitly clear that HTS has not entirely shed its extremist past and remains a proscribed terrorist organisation internationally. The American Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) describes HTS (as of 2022) as “primarily focused on attacks against the Assad regime and seeking to replace it with a government guided by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law. HTS employs suicide attacks, guerrilla tactics, and small-arms units to execute its assaults.” Thus, while Assad’s use of the term 'terrorist' is undoubtedly manipulative and self-serving, the designation of HTS as a terrorist organisation reflects an international consensus that such groups must be scrutinised carefully. This article does not seek to absolve HTS of its actions but rather to highlight how autocrats like Assad exploit terrorism rhetoric to justify their atrocities.
Why use terrorists over the opposition?
While the application is valid, it does not explain why Assad uses it so frequently. He could have opted for other descriptors, such as “opposition” or “enemy.” Instead, in 602 words, he relies solely on terrorism-related language, which appears over eight times. To put that into perspective, he refers to “Syria” or “Syrians” only six times.
This is an attempt to delegitimise his opponents domestically and internationally. No one wishes to be ruled by terrorists and governments are unlikely to negotiate with terrorists—for example, the UK refuses to recognise the Taliban, a proscribed group, as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
More than that, this language legitimises any actions that Assad has taken to stop HTS. Nobody would feel sympathy for terrorists—even in the event of war crimes. For instance, in 2017, Khan Shaykhun in HTS-controlled Idlib was the site of the “deadliest use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war since the Ghouta chemical attack in 2013." Eighty-nine people were killed, 33 of them children, and 541 were injured. However, to combat a terrorist, this could be argued as morally justified. If anything, this underscores the nuance needed when considering terrorism rhetoric, as this attack could be regarded as an act of terror. It aligns with Primoratz’s definition; it entails deliberate violence against innocents to intimidate them or to compel the rebels to cease fighting. Assad’s ongoing and intentional efforts to only label HTS as terrorists force them into an ‘other’ perceived as immoral and inhuman, capable of inflicting horrific violence upon innocent people and children. The application is manipulative, given the circumstances surrounding who utilises it. Assad has been able to persist with his human rights abuses under the guise of ridding Syria of terrorists, thereby legitimising himself in the eyes of both his people and his opponents in the international arena, aligning Assad as part of the global war on terror, fighting Al Qa’ida and its associates.
Assad is not alone in his technique. Fellow autocrat Vladimir Putin, throughout his lengthy career, has utilised terrorism to legitimise his position. From the outset, his response to the 1999 Moscow Apartment Bombings, vowing to “pursue them everywhere … we’ll wipe them out in the outhouse.”, significantly boosted his popularity, leading to his election as President in 2000. However, it has been claimed that the attacks were an inside job to provoke this reaction. Whether true or not, the power of his rhetoric is quite apparent. More recently, amid the Russia-Ukraine war, on 22nd March 2024, Moscow suffered another horrific terrorist attack by IS, which resulted in over 137 fatalities. To capitalise on the rhetorical power, Putin “repeatedly indicated that Ukraine and the country’s Western partners are the real culprits”, even in the face of “overwhelming evidence pointing to Islamic State terrorists”. This allowed him to justify war crimes, given the ‘moral faults’ of his opposition, strengthen himself as a leader and justify his entire attack against Ukraine.
Conclusion
This article urges greater scrutiny when autocrats invoke terrorism rhetoric. With an incredibly pejorative descriptor that is impossible to define and ripe for interpretation, it is no wonder that autocratic dictators are using it to their advantage. As such, caution, critical thinking, and analytical rigour are essential when engaging with this topic.
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