This briefing provides a background to Ahmed al-Mansour, looks at how a revolution could impact Egypt economically, and explores further international implications. This piece was written by Ross Plowman and edited by Joe Card.
Background
On 14 January 2025, the Syrian authorities arrested Ahmed al-Mansour for attempting to incite a revolution in Egypt. Al-Mansour is Egyptian and had been fighting alongside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) for the liberation of Syria from Bashar al-Assad since 2013. Just three days prior to his arrest, al-Mansour and his fellow ‘January 25 Revolutionaries’ announced the plan to export Syria’s revolution to Egypt: ‘The question that occupies the minds of Egyptians at home and abroad is: Who? How? And when?’. The threat is real: Egypt houses 1.5 million Syrian refugees who fled from the Assad regime and the Egyptian population feels increasingly disenfranchised. Al-Mansour’s arrest was likely a signal to the international community by Ahmed al-Sharaa al-Jolani, the leader of HTS, that the new Syrian regime does not endorse al-Mansour’s efforts to destabilise neighbouring Arab countries.
The movement’s name goes back to the 2011 revolution against the Mubarak regime. However, the green flag with the crescent moon and three stars is a return to the pre-1952 flag of the Kingdom of Egypt. Al-Mansour and the January 25 Revolutionaries have picked up significant media attention, further popularising the movement. Furthermore, an arabic hashtag has gained traction online since the fall of Assad: ‘جاك ـ الدورـ يا ـ ديكتاتور#’ which translates to ‘your turn next O Dictator’, referring to President Abdelfattah al-Sisi. That Sisi banned entry for almost all Syrians into Egypt on 4 January 2025 reveals his concern about the dissemination of revolutionary ideas a week before al-Mansour’s statement. A sweeping ban such as this is not uncharacteristic of the Sisi regime. Outlined by the Amnesty International review last month, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances and limits on free speech are the norm in Egypt. Consequently, tyranny was one of the key themes in the statement by the January 25 Revolutionaries.
A country in socioeconomic decline?
Independently of Sisi, Egypt’s dependency predicament has been plaguing its economy since Gemal Abdel Nasser, the first president of the Arab Republic of Egypt. However, the financial negligence of the Sisi has perpetuated further socioeconomic decline as inflation and debt soar. To consolidate Sisi’s power, the Egyptian army controls most industries in the economy. This deters private sector investment and results in market failure. For example, mismanagement of domestic gas production has led to regular blackouts for everyday Egyptians. Little has improved since the 2022 Arab Barometer reported that food scarcity in Egypt was highest in the region at 68%, a problem Sisi has failed to grapple with. The impact of Sisi’s growing authoritarianism is notable.
A focus on internal strife does not preclude the importance of exogenous shocks. Since the beginning of the Houthi attacks on maritime trade in the Red Sea, revenue from the Suez Canal has dropped by $7 billion (60%). Historically, however, Egypt has been able to leverage its proximity to Israel to receive over $90 billion of military and economic assistance from the US since 1946. In March 2024, Egypt received roughly $57 billion in financial support from the UAE, World Bank, IMF and EU. The $8 billion loan from the IMF requires a budget surplus of 2% of GDP rising to 5% after three years. Egypt is expected to fall short of the FY2025/26 IMF target unless Sisi is willing to relinquish military control of key industries and welcome private sector investment. Nevertheless, it is likely that the IMF will overlook shortcomings as a consequence of the unprecedented regional circumstances.
Instead of improved socioeconomic conditions from the international financial support, authoritarianism and corruption continues to be the norm. Egypt’s ‘Rule of Law’ score fell from 0.43 in 2015 to 0.35 in 2024, ranking 135th out of 142 countries in the survey. Of the factors that contribute to this score, Egypt ranks either third or second-last globally for ‘Constraints on Government’, ‘Open Government’ and ‘Fundamental Rights’ with some scores as low as 0.07 out of 1.
Amongst other investment purposes, much of the foreign financial support is conditional upon Egyptian protection of Israeli security interests. On the one hand, Sisi was restrained in calling for an end to the assault on Gaza - only tentatively supporting the ICJ genocide case against Israel. On the other hand, he was concerned that the decimation of Hamas could make Gaza a potential breeding ground for a new form of violent extremism. This would only serve to exacerbate terrorism in the Sinai, which saw 92 ISIS-related attacks in 2022. All the while, Sisi’s hedging has been criticised by some in the Egyptian public and the Arab world for his complicity in the bombardment of Gaza. Therefore, this marks another source of civil unrest because many in Egypt feel that Sisi is failing to protect the rights of Palestinians in Gaza. This was the backdrop to the movement of the January 25 Revolutionaries.
What would a revolution look like?
Predicting the impact of a revolution in Egypt is difficult. Indeed, few were able to foresee the swift changeover in Syria. Furthermore, precisely how a revolution is carried out would determine the size of the ripples across the Mediterranean, Levant and Africa. An obvious winner from a revolution would be the Muslim Brotherhood. Since Sisi ousted them in 2013 and designated them a terrorist organisation, the Muslim Brotherhood has been almost entirely marginalised from the political scene in Egypt. If HTS and al-Jolani are able to demonstrate the competence of political Islam in Syria, more secular regimes across the Islamic world face challenges to their authority, not just Sisi.
Immediately, a revolution in Egypt would have disastrous financial consequences, with Egypt’s dependency trap becoming apparent. Annual loans from the EU, IMF and US would stop and future prospects for investment like the planned $5 billion Saudi purchase of Ras Ghamila would collapse. As a result, key industries would grind to a halt and current investors would cut their losses, selling off their remaining assets. The repercussions of the economic crisis would almost certainly worsen socioeconomic conditions for ordinary Egyptians.
Israeli security would also be under threat should the Sisi government fall. Since the first Egypt-Israel peace treaty at Camp David in 1979, Egypt has been a key guarantor of Israeli security interests. It is unlikely that a new, revolutionary Egyptian government would continue this policy. Extremist groups in northern Sinai would likely exploit any instability to boost their presence in the region. Despite Israel’s efforts to quell ISIS in the region, these dormant groups would likely capitalise from a change in regime. This would bring further challenges such as a resumption in weapons smuggling to leftover Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants after Egypt regains control of the Philadelphi corridor with Gaza in mid-March of this year.
Regionally, Egypt’s neighbours would suffer from declining contributions to the energy networks. Egypt provides Sudan, Libya and Jordan with hundreds of megawatts of electricity annually as a result of renewable energy projects funded by foreign direct investment. It is unlikely that the same levels of support would continue uninterrupted should the Sisi government collapse. Sudan, Libya and Jordan can ill-afford such exogenous shocks to their system and face crises of their own in the event of energy deficits. This is not exclusive to electricity. Partnerships with Greece, Cyprus and Israel have been fostered over pipelines exporting Egypt’s liquefied natural gas across the Mediterranean. Therefore, Europe in general is likely to lose out if operations of the Leviathan-Idku, Aphrodite-Idku or Ramat Hovav-Nitzana pipelines were to cease.
A revolution to be realised?
The level of authoritarian control and the financial backing of the West indicate that it is unlikely that a revolution will occur soon, despite the best efforts of al-Mansour and the other January 25 Revolutionaries. Social media can often misrepresent the resonance of ideas. While many on X and Telegram endorsed and shared the messages of the January 25 Revolutionaries, few are willing to make the first move. Some in online forums voiced their disappointment after the regime changes in 2011 and 2013. Therefore, there may not be the same eagerness for revolution now as there was under Mubarak. Even those that express contempt for Sisi display concern about what a new regime could look like, especially if led by Islamists.
There are some parallels to draw between Sisi’s Egypt and Assad’s Syria. The sheer grip of the army on key infrastructural assets and industries have made it seemingly impossible for any opposition to gather momentum. Currently, there is no obvious successor to the current President. Again Sisi arbitrarily imprisoned his only political opponent last year, Ahmed al-Tantawi, the leader of the leftist party. Furthermore, the levels of political censorship are similar. The regime even arrested Egyptian social media influencers for openly criticising Sisi on their TikTok and YouTube channels.
Like Bashar al-Assad, Sisi’s rule is further protected by having family members in positions of authority in Egypt’s General Intelligence Services and the telecommunications sector. Most worrisome are the comparisons between Syria’s Sednaya torture prison and the Scorpion Prison, south of Cairo. Fortunately for Egypt, its geostrategic importance prevents too much condemnation from the West. For example, PM Sir Keir Starmer is reluctant to call on Sisi to release British-Egyptian political prisoner Alaa Abd el-Fattah after his arbitrary detention. Arguably, the continued financial support to Egypt is more interests-driven rather than values-driven. Yet, consistently banking on Egypt’s status as ‘too big to fail’ has led to the downfall of his predecessors and it is unlikely that Sisi will retain his power in the long run without addressing the urgent need for economic and political reform.
Though he is able to imprison political dissenters at a moment’s notice, his authority appears fragile. His inability to control a government-orchestrated protest against the atrocities in Gaza is testament to this insecurity. Anticipating future challenges to his authority will be decisive in his overall consolidation of power. Climate change remains a consequential risk for Egypt. There is a realistic possibility that the new desalination plants will not be robust enough to deal with Sisi’s poor management of the Nile river and Ethiopia’s hydroelectric dam developments. Therefore, it is likely that by 2050 rising temperatures and sea levels will displace millions of Egyptians.
Despite his untrustworthy track record of reforms, the repressive nature of the Egyptian state seems to have gone unpunished. For the time being, Sisi's promise to privatise ten state-owned enterprises has encouraged the IMF, the EU or the World Bank to turn a blind eye to Sisi’s authoritarian strategies for survival. This, in addition to Egypt’s exemption from the US aid cut off, gives Sisi a carte blanche for continued authoritarian rule.
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